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THE COURT CONFRONTS THE GERRYMANDER
JOSEPH C. COATES, III
T HE UNITED States Supreme Court refused to squarely ad-
dress political gerrymandering until 1986. In Davis v.
Bandemer, the Court held that political gerrymandering was justi-
ciable and violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2 In this Comment the author discusses the nature of
political gerrymandering, the Court's decision, its potential impact,
and finally, the justifications for the Court's decision.3
I. THE NATURE OF GERRYMANDERING
Gerrymandering is a political device with a long history in Amer-
ican politics. The term originated in 1812, when the Democratic-
Republican (Jeffersonian) controlled Massachusetts Legislature di-
vided the County of Essex into two senatorial districts to dilute
the strength of the Federalists. An artist depicted the map of the
district as a creature that looked like a salamander. A newspaper
editor labeled the creature a "gerrymander" in honor of the Gover-
nor, Elbridge Gerry.
There is a tendency to equate gerrymandering with districts hav-
ing bizarre, contorted shapes and sizes that "weave and wind" all
over the map.' This is wrong because gerrymandering can exist in
geographically compact and contiguous districts.6 To begin any
discussion of gerrymandering, one must first define the term. Com-
mentators and the courts have struggled for a definition. The
noted scholar Robert Dixon, Jr. wrote that "gerrymandering is dis-
criminatory districting. It equally covers squiggles, multi-member
districting, or simple non-action, when the result is racial or politi-
cal malrepresentation. ' '7 This definition has been accepted by some
members of the Court who define gerrymandering as "the deliber-
1. 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. This Comment will be concerned solely with the constitutionality of political gerry-
mandering. However, references will be made to racial gerrymandering for illustrative or
comparative purposes.
4. Engstrom, Post-Census Representational Districting: The Supreme Court, "One Per-
son, One Vote," and The Gerrymandering Issue, 7 S.U.L. REv. 173, 207 (1981).
5. BAKER, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?, in REAPPOR-
TIONMENT IN THE 1970's 121, 122 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
6. Id.
7. R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITIcs 460
(1968).
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ate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations
for partisan or personal political purposes.""
Gerrymandering has been in existence throughout our political
history and is regarded as the inevitable byproduct of the Ameri-
can system of legislative elections by district.9 Three conditions are
required before gerrymandering can exist: 1) one party must have
sufficient control over the legislative powers of a state (including
the governor); 2) the minority party must be large enough to be a
target; and 3) the majority must be cohesive so that it will deal
with the gerrymandering process as a party rather than a collection
of individuals.10
A. Recent Trends
While gerrymandering has been a part of American politics since
at least 1705,11 it is widely believed that the apportionment revolu-
tion of the 1960s exacerbated its effects. The apportionment
revolution began with the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Baker v. Carr,2 holding that malapportionment was a justicia-
ble issue. Baker was rapidly followed by Wesberry v. Sanders1 3
and Reynolds v. Sims,1' which signaled the Court's preoccupation
with population equality for state and congressional districts. This
emphasis on the "one man, one vote" standard of population
equality has done nothing to limit or hinder gerrymandering, but
has only encouraged it.' 5
8. Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 786 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Kirkpat-
rick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1981) (Fortas, J., concurring)). See also BAKER, supra
note 5, at 121.
9. MAYHEW, Congressional Representation: Theory And Practice In Drawing The Dis-
tricts, in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 249, 275 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
10. R. DIXON, supra note 7, at 462.
11. Engstrom, supra note 4, at 207 n.153. Discriminatory districting was first identified
in 1705, when the colonial legislature of Pennsylvania sought to minimize the political
strength of Philadelphia. Id. (citing E. GRIFFITH, THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE GERRY-
MANDER 26-29, 120-21 (1907)).
12. 369 U.S. 186 (1964). For a discussion of the "reapportionment revolution," see R.
DIXON, supra note 7, at 3.
13. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). The Court construed U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 to require "as nearly as
possible one man's vote in a congressional election to be worth as much as another's." Id. at
7-8.
14. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). The Court required a "substantial equality of the population
among the various state legislative districts." Id. at 539.
15. Baker, Judicial Determination of Political Gerrymandering: A "Totality of Circum-
stances" Approach, 3 J.L. & POL. 1 (1986) [hereinafter Totality of Circumstances Ap-
proach]. "[I1f the experience following the 1970, 1980 censuses has demonstrated anything,
it is that the most extreme form of gerrymandering can indeed flourish within the most
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The apportionment revolution increased the possibility of politi-
cal gerrymandering for several reasons. The Court's decisions re-
quired that the states reapportion every ten years, something
many had failed to do previously, giving legislators more opportu-
nities to gerrymander."6 The widespread use of computer technol-
ogy has enabled legislators to develop highly partisan plans despite
the presence of absolute population equality. 17 The emphasis on
population equality permits or may actually require that other
traditional factors such as community, geographic, and political
subdivision boundaries be ignored in the name of "one man, one
vote," thereby eliminating potential constraints on line drawing.'8
The concern of increased partisan gerrymandering was noted by
the dissenters in Kirkpatrick v. Preisler'9 and Wells v. Rockefel-
ler.2 Justice Harlan wrote, "the Court's exclusive concentration
upon arithmetic blinds it to the realities of the political process...
• The fact of the matter is that a rule of absolute equality is per-
fectly compatible with 'gerrymandering' of the worse sort."' 2' Kirk-
patrick and Wells were seen as giving legislators a green light to
gerrymander without regard to former county lines or other politi-
cal subdivisions.2 2
B. Judicial Development of Political Gerrymandering Prior to
Davis v. Bandemer
The concerns of the minority in Wells v. Rockefeller were not
met by any intervention by the Court into the gerrymandering is-
sue until Davis v. Bandemer. During the period between the late
1960s and 1986, the Court avoided facing the issue of political ger-
rymandering directly, though it accepted review of cases involving
racial gerrymandering.2 3 The Court's reluctance to deal with the
miniscule population variances. The absence of other constraints has permitted political car-
tographers virtually unchecked discretion in creating districts." Id. at 6.
16. Engstrom, supra note 4, at 208. For example, in 1964 Georgia had not reapportioned
its congressional districts since 1930. Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 1, 2.
17. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 776 (1982) (White, J., dissenting); see also Engstrom, supra
note 4, at 208.
18. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 784 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Totality of Circum-
stances Approach, supra note 15, at 2.
19. 394 U.S. 526 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 542.
21. Id. at 551.
22. BAKER, supra note 5, at 135.
23. Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), was the first case to rule directly on claims
of racial gerrymandering. See also R. DIXON, supra note 7, at 464-65.
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issue could be attributed to the fear of entering that most partisan
of all "political thickets."'24
Prior to 1986, however, the Court was not completely silent
about the gerrymandering issue. The first case to deal with gerry-
mandering was Gomillion v. Lightfoot.2 5 Gomillion involved an at-
tempt by the city of Tuskeegee to redefine its boundaries from a
square into a twenty-eight sided figure for the purpose of removing
all but four of its population's 400 blacks. The Court struck down
the plan as violative of the fifteenth amendment. The Court's ra-
tionale was centered on the clearly racially motivated attempt to
exclude blacks from participating in politics in Tuskeegee, and did
not address the case in terms of gerrymandering.2 6
After Gomillion, the Court began to review claims of racial ger-
rymandering. In Wright v. Rockefeller,27 the plaintiffs charged that
the New York congressional delegation had been gerrymandered.
In Wright, the Republican controlled legislature placed nonwhites
and Puerto Ricans into one congressional district in Manhattan so
that they constituted 86% of the district's population. At the same
time, a district comprised of 95% whites was created for then Re-
publican Congressman, John Lindsey. The Court rejected the ra-
cial gerrymandering charge, but only after affirming a "finding" by
the district court that the districts were not established with an
intent to segregate on the basis of race.28 Thus the Court impliedly
confronted the gerrymandering issue and adjudicated the claim on
its merits.
In a series of cases involving racial gerrymandering decided after
Wright, the Court noted that an apportionment plan would be
struck down as unconstitutional if it "operate[d] to minimize or
cancel out the voting strength of racial or political elements of the
voting population. '"29 This language indicated the Court's concern
with the political gerrymandering issue, but this concern was not
acted upon until Davis v. Bandemer.
24. The term "political thicket" was coined by Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v.
Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946), where the Court dismissed a complaint brought against a
grossly malapportioned Illinois Congressional district.
25. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
26. Id. at 346.
27. 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
28. Id. at 58.
29. Forston v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (emphasis added). See also Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 143 (1971); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966).
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING
In Gaffney v. Cummings,0 the Court was first faced with a claim
of political discrimination under the equal protection clause. The
claim involved the reapportionment plan of the Connecticut Legis-
lature which was prepared by a bipartisan apportionment board
that attempted to draw the district lines to reflect a "rough scheme
of proportional representation of the two major political parties."3'
The districts were constructed "so that the composition of both
Houses would reflect 'as closely as possible . . .the actual [state-
wide] plurality of votes on the House or Senate lines in a given
election.' ",32 Despite the bipartisan board, officials of the state
Democratic party brought suit challenging the plan on both popu-
lation equality and fourteenth amendment grounds. The Court
held that the plan did not violate the fourteenth amendment be-
cause it attempted a rough proportional scheme.33 The Court ob-
served that the overt political motivation in the plan alone was in-
sufficient to make the plan unconstitutional, particularly as the
plan attempted to fairly allocate seats on the basis of population.
The Court recognized that a plan drawn without any political con-
sideration whatsoever could create "the most grossly gerry-
mandered results. 3 4 While not expressly addressing the issue of
justiciability of gerrymandering claims, the Court noted that reap-
portionment and redistricting "is not wholly exempt from judicial
review" and should be conducted within certain limits so as not to
exclude racial or political groups from the political process.3 5 Gaff-
ney, however, did not contain a detailed analysis of the gerryman-
dering issue and certainly provided no standards. After Gaffney, it
was still an open question whether political gerrymandering claims
were justiciable, and if so, whether they would be held
unconstitutional.
In 1983, a majority of the Court indicated that it was willing to
address the political gerrymandering issue. The justices made their
views known in Karcher v. Daggett."6 Karcher involved the New
Jersey reapportionment of congressional seats after the 1980 cen-
sus. The districts drawn under the reapportionment plan (Feldman
Plan) had an average deviation from the mean of 0.1384% or about
30. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
31. Id. at 738.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 753.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 754.
36. 462 U.S. 725 (1983).
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726 people.3 7 Despite the infinitesimal population difference in the
districts, the Court held the plan unconstitutional as violative of
article I, section 2 of the United States Constitution.
The Court's holding rested in part on the fact that the plan was
not the product of a good faith effort to achieve population equal-
ity. The dispositive factor in the analysis was the existence of other
plans introduced in the state legislature which had smaller devia-
tions. According to the Court, the failure to adopt the alternative
plans evidenced a failure to make a good faith effort to achieve
population equality. 38 The Court also noted that a state's interest
in legitimate objectives such as compact districts, respecting mu-
nicipal boundaries, preserving old districts, and avoiding contests
between incumbents could justify some deviation in population. 9
New Jersey, however, could not justify the plan on any of the
above grounds.4 °
The political gerrymandering issue was scrutinized in the sepa-
rate opinions. Justice Stevens faced the gerrymandering issue
squarely and wrote "political gerrymandering is one species of
'vote dilution' that is proscribed by the Equal Protection
Clause. '41 Justice Powell, who could not have been more eager to
address the political gerrymandering issue, stated, "I therefore am
prepared to entertain constitutional challenges to partisan gerry-
mandering that reaches the level of discrimination described by
Justice Stevens.""2 Justice White, writing for Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Powell, and Chief Justice Burger also mentioned the im-
pact the majority's insistence upon numerical equality would have
on gerrymandering. 43
From Gomillion to Karcher, the Court was exposed to the politi-
cal gerrymandering issue. Despite language in the cases that ap-
peared to indicate the justiciability of political gerrymandering,
the Court had not spoken authoritatively on the subject. After
Karcher, with at least two justices giving clear signals that they
would consider a gerrymandering claim, the stage was set for a di-
37. Id. at 728.
38. Id. at 738-39.
39. Id. at 740.
40. Id. at 741.
41. Id. at 744 (Stevens, J., concurring).
42. Id. at 787 (Powell, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 776-77 (White, J., dissenting). Despite concern with gerrymandering, Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger subsequently joined the dissent in Davis, 106 S. Ct. at
2816, opposing the justiciability of the issue.
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rect challenge to a reapportionment plan as political gerrymander-
ing in violation of equal protection.
II. DAVIS V. BANDEMER
Davis v. Bandemer" is the first case in which the Court squarely
held that political gerrymandering is justiciable and that it can be
violative of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause.
After the 1980 census, the Indiana Legislature began the process of
reapportioning the state's legislative districts. The governorship
and the majority of both houses of the legislature were in Republi-
can hands. The apportionment plan was conceived by the Republi-
cans without input from Democrats, and passed both houses on a
party line vote.45 The plan provided for a mix of single-member,
double-member, and triple-member districts for the House, and
single-member districts for the Senate. Members of the Indiana
Democratic Party46 filed suit in early 1982, contending that the
plan violated their rights as Democrats to equal protection under
the fourteenth amendment.
Before the case was tried by a three-judge district court,47 the
1982 Indiana elections were held. In the state house elections, the
Democrats received 51.9% of the total statewide votes, but won
only 43 seats-a discrepancy of 8.9%. The Democrats polled
53.1% of the statewide vote for senatorial candidates and won thir-
teen out of twenty-five senate seats up for election that year. The
district court found that the plan constituted an intentional effort
to favor the Republicans and disadvantage the Democrats. 8 In
particular, the district court found the multimember districts used
in Marion (Indianapolis) and Allen (Fort Wayne) Counties clearly
showed discriminatory line drawing because Democrats received
44. 106 S. Ct. 2797 (1986).
45. The bills in both houses were vehicle bills and contained nothing of substance. The
actual plan was passed and then referred to a conference committee whose voting members
were exclusively Republicans. Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1483 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
46. The Indiana NAACP also filed a suit challenging a plan as an unconstitutional dilu-
tion of the black vote in violation of the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments and the Vot-
ing Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The District Court re-
jected the NAACP's claims because blacks were not discriminated against as blacks, but as
Democrats. Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2803 n.8.
47. The three-judge panel was authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (1983), which pro-
vides that such a panel shall be established when a challenge is made concerning the consti-
tutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts or of any statewide legislative
body.
48. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479 (S.D. Ind. 1984).
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46.6% of the vote, but won only three seats, or just 14% of the
total. Partially based on the above election returns, the court also
found the plan had a discriminatory effect. With evidence of dis-
criminatory intent and impact, the divided district court held that
the reapportionment plan was unconstitutional and ordered the
Indiana Legislature to prepare a new plan. ' 9
A. The Decision of the Court
The United States Supreme Court opinion can be divided into
two separate sections. First, the justiciability issue, and second, the
equal protection analysis. Writing for a six justice majority,50 Jus-
tice White initially faced the issue of whether claims of political
gerrymandering were justiciable. He immediately dismissed the
precedential value of earlier decisions in which the Court had sum-
marily affirmed cases which rejected gerrymandering claims as
nonjusticiable. Justice White indicated that the Court now felt it
appropriate to give the issue full consideration, and accordingly
was not bound by those decisions.5 1
Justice White then examined gerrymandering in terms of the po-
litical question 52 analysis articulated in Baker v. Carr.5 3 In apply-
49. Id. at 1496.
50. Justice White's analysis of the justiciability of gerrymandering was endorsed by a
total of six justices-Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. Justice White's
opinion overturning the decision of the district court constituted a plurality of
four-Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall. Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens,
would affirm the district court's finding of a violation of equal protection. Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor dissented from Justice White's justiciability
analysis but concurred in the judgment that the district court be reversed.
51. Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2804. The cases which the Court had given summary treatment
were: WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 382 U.S. 4 (1965), summarily a/f'g 238 F. Supp. 916
(S.D.N.Y. 1965); Jimenez v. Hidalgo County Water Improvement Dist. No. 2, 424 U.S. 950
(1976), summarily aff'g 68 F.R.D. 668 (S.D. Tex. 1975); Ferrell v. Hall, 406 U.S. 939 (1972),
summarily aff'g 339 F. Supp. 73 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Wells v. Rockefeller, 398 U.S. 901
(1970), summarily aff'g 311 F. Supp. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
52. The political question doctrine is a self-imposed limitation on a court's jurisdiction
that it will not decide certain questions which are better suited for other branches of gov-
ernment to decide. Its origin can be traced to Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796)
(where the court refused to decide whether a treaty had been broken). The case usually
associated with the origin of the doctrine is Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)
(where the Court refused to rule which government of Rhode Island was legitimate under
the guaranty clause in light of the prior decision made by the President). See R. DIXON,
supra note 7, at 101; R. CARR, THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 197 (1942).
53. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The standards are:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
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ing the Baker standards, the Court found that political gerryman-
dering did not present a political question. First, the Court held
that the gerrymandering question did not involve the Court in a
decision more properly decided by a co-equal branch of the federal
government; the decisions under review were made by the state
legislature, not Congress. Second, it was evident that due to the
Court's intervention, there was no risk of foreign or domestic dis-
turbance. Third, the Court was unpersuaded that the issue was
amenable to judicially discoverable and manageable standards.5 4
Justice White focused closely on the last part of the political ques-
tion analysis. He noted that Baker v. Carr held that malapportion-
ment was justiciable before the advent of the "one person, one vote
rule."5 The fact that the solution to gerrymandering may not be as
susceptible to standardization did not make gerrymandering a po-
litical question.
Furthermore, Justice White saw no reason to differentiate be-
tween claims of political gerrymandering and claims of racial ger-
rymandering, which the Court had adjudicated on the merits."6
Therefore, based on the Baker analysis and the fact that the politi-
cal question doctrine did not require the Court to avoid all ques-
tions involving politics, the Court found political gerrymandering
to be justiciable.
The second part of Justice White's opinion dealt with the stan-
dards which would be applied to political gerrymandering claims.
Writing for a plurality of four,57 Justice White wrote that "the
Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional dis-
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding with-
out an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution
without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of govern-
ment; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political deci-
sion already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question. Unless one of
these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no
dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political question's pres-
ence. The doctrine of which we treat is one of "political questions," not one
of "political cases."
Id. at 217.
54. 106 S. Ct. at 2805.
55. The "one person, one vote" standard for remedying malapportioned legislatures was
articulated in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557-61 (1964), two years after the decision in
Baker v. Carr.
56. 106 S. Ct. at 2806. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v.
Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
57. See supra note 50 for a discussion of the justices voting alignments.
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crimination against an identifiable political group and an actual
discriminatory effect on that group." 58 The plurality had little
trouble in finding that the first prong of the equal protection anal-
ysis was satisfied, noting that "it should not be very difficult to
prove that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment
were intended." 59 Justice White pragmatically realized that when a
legislature redistricts it is fully aware of the political consequences
of its decision. The majority party of the legislature has informa-
tion concerning the political profile of the state, voting records,
and party registration on which to base their district lines. Justice
White wrote: "The reality is that districting inevitably has and is
intended to have substantial political consequences. "60
While the plurality had little trouble in satisfying the discrimi-
natory intent prong, Justice White did not accept the lower court's
finding of actual discriminatory effect. The plurality rejected the
district court's analysis that "Democratic voters need only show
that their proportionate voting influence has been adversely af-
fected."6 Justice White reaffirmed earlier decisions of the Court
which held that the Constitution did not require proportional rep-
resentation for districts that would approximate the anticipated
statewide vote of a political party.62 The mere fact that a party's
number of seats won in an election did not reflect its share of the
vote statewide was not enough to show a violation of equal protec-
tion. The plurality recognized that such a result could be a func-
tion of the winner-take-all system of district elections typical in
American politics."
58. 106 S. Ct. at 2808.
59. Id. at 2809.
60. Id. at 2808.
61. Id. at 2809 (citing Davis, 603 F. Supp. at 1492).
62. Id. (citing White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124
(1971)). See also Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 79 (1980) ("ft]he Court has sternly set its
face against the claim, however phrased, that the Constitution some how guarantees propor-
tional representation").
63. Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2809:
If all or most of the districts are competitive-defined by the District
Court in this case as districts in which the anticipated split in the party
vote is within the range of 45% to 55%-even a narrow statewide prefer-
ence for either party would produce an overwhelming majority for the win-
ning party in the state legislature. This consequence, however, is inherent
in the winner-take-all, district-based elections, and we cannot hold that
such a reapportionment law would violate the Equal Protection Clause be-
cause the voters in the losing party do not have representation in the legis-
lature in proportion to the statewide vote received by their party
candidates.
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The plurality determined that an equal protection violation has
occurred "only when the electoral system is arranged in a manner
that will consistently degrade a voter's or a group of voters' influ-
ence on the political process as a whole." 64 To support a claim of
unconstitutional gerrymandering, the plurality required evidence
that the reapportionment scheme showed a "continued frustration
of the will of a majority of the voters or effective denial to a minor-
ity of voters of a fair chance to influence the political process. "65
The plurality deliberately chose a high threshold for political ger-
rymandering claims in part because Justice White realized that to
hold otherwise would invite an avalanche of gerrymandering claims
involving federal courts in the work traditionally borne by state
legislators. In summary, a plan has to have "sufficiently serious"
effects before the courts should act."
Applying the above principles to the facts at hand, Justice White
concluded that the results of a single election were insufficient to
prove unconstitutional discrimination. 1 In the only real analysis of
the discriminatory effect standard, Justice White listed certain fac-
tors not found by the lower court.6 First, there was no showing
that the Democrats could not take control of the legislature in one
of the next elections, nor did the district court inquire as to what
percentage of the statewide vote the Democrats needed in order to
take control. Secondly, there was no finding that the Democrats
would be consigned to minority status throughout the 1980s with
no possibility of improving their situation after the 1990 census.
The above factors are important because they shed some light on
what is required to make a prima facie showing of discriminatory
effect.
Justice White reiterated that the claim before the Court was a
statewide claim. Therefore, the fact that particular districts were
constructed to be safely in the hands of one party did not consti-
tute statewide discrimination. 9 Because of the nature of the state-
wide claim, the grossly disproportionate results in Marion and Al-
len Counties could pass constitutional muster. The Court again
64. Id. at 2810.
65. Id. at 2811.
66. Id. The plurality also implied that the threshold showing for a political gerrymander-
ing claim might be higher than that for other equal protection cases. Id. at n.14.
67. Id. at 2812.
68. Id.
69. Id. The plurality had to make this finding or overrule Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735 (1973), which upheld the Connecticut districting plan despite its tendency to create safe
districts which afforded minorities in those districts little chance of political success.
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emphasized that returns from one election do not constitute gerry-
mandering in violation of the equal protection clause, rather, there
must be a showing of a history of disproportionate results. 0
In addition to Justice White's plurality opinion, three additional
opinions were rendered. Chief Justice Burger wrote a very short
opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice O'Connor, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist, also filed an opinion con-
curring in the judgment, and Justice Powell, joined by Justice Ste-
vens, wrote an opinion concurring in the plurality's treatment of
the justiciability issue and dissenting from the judgment reversing
the district court's finding of a violation of equal protection.
Chief Justice Burger believed the Court should stay away from
the gerrymandering issue. He observed that the remedy to the
plaintiff's claim was in the hands of the electorate, not the courts.71
Justice O'Connor expressed the view that claims of political ger-
rymandering are not justiciable because they constitute a political
question. First, Justice O'Connor feared that the plurality opinion
would inevitably lead to a system of rough proportional represen-
tation.7 2 Second, according to Justice O'Connor, Baker v. Carr,
Reynolds v. Sims, and their progeny do not lead to the conclusion
that partisan gerrymandering is also a justiciable issue. Justice
O'Connor distinguished Baker v. Carr as a case based on an indi-
vidual right to have a citizen's vote weighed equally against all
other citizens. The rights asserted in the present case were group
rights, and political gerrymandering did not dilute an individual's
vote "in the sense in which that word was used in the Reynolds
case."73 Third, Justice O'Connor sought to distinguish the protec-
tions afforded to racial minorities from the protections now af-
forded members of the two major political parties. Members of the
Democratic and Republican parties, she contended, could not
claim to be discrete and insular minorities warranting special pro-
tection in the political process. She noted that the two major polit-
ical parties were the dominant groups in the political process and
that they lacked the history of discrimination characteristic of
other groups deserving of special protections from the Court.
Fourth, she maintained that political gerrymandering is a "self-
limiting enterprise, because an over-ambitious gerrymander can
lead to disaster for the party drawing the lines. This result occurs
70. Id. at 2814.
71. Id. at 2816 (Burger, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
72. Id. at 2818 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
73. Id. at 2820.
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because in order to have an opportunity to win even more seats,
the party spreads itself too thin, weakening its safe seats and plac-
ing them at risk. ' 74 Finally, Justice O'Connor wrote that the plu-
rality's decision left no judicially manageable standard by which to
measure gerrymandering. She feared that the Court's standard
would "over time either prove unmanageable and arbitrary or else
evolve towards some loose form of proportionality," a result she
concluded "would be calamitous for the federal courts, for the
States, and for our two-party system. 7 5
Justice Powell, in an opinion joined by Justice Stevens, ap-
proved of the plurality's justiciability analysis but would affirm the
district court's finding of an unconstitutional gerrymandering. He
also agreed with the plurality's two-pronged equal protection anal-
ysis, requiring a showing of discriminatory intent and effect. 76 He
disagreed, however, with the plurality's finding that the Demo-
cratic voters did not suffer a dilution of their statewide voting
strength. Justice Powell described the plurality's analysis as a "one
person, one vote" test, and believed this was insufficient to deter-
mine whether an unconstitutional gerrymandering was enacted. He
interpreted the plurality decision as relying almost exclusively on
the "one man, one vote" principle and attacked the plurality opin-
ion as not protective of group rights. "[Tihe essence of a claim,"
wrote Justice Powell, "is that members of a political party have
been denied their right to 'fair and effective representation.' "7
Justice Powell would propose that an unconstitutional gerryman-
dering exists when "the boundaries of the voting districts have
been distorted deliberately and arbitrarily to achieve illegitimate
ends. '78 In order to evaluate the claims of an unconstitutional ger-
rymandering, the claims must be measured by such neutral criteria
as configurations of the districts, observance of political subdivi-
sion lines, the legislative procedures by which the apportionment
law was adopted, and the legislative history reflecting legislative
goals. 9
Justice Powell wrote that the biggest problem with the plural-
ity's opinion was the failure to enuciate any standards to guide leg-
74. Id. at 2820-21 (citing B. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE 154-55 (1984)).
75. Id. at 2822.
76. Id. at 2825 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
77. Id. at 2826.
78. Id. at 2827 (citing Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 525, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J.,
concurring)).
79. Id. at 2823, 2827.
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islators and the courts. In his view, to establish a claim of uncon-
stitutional gerrymandering, the plaintiff would be required to offer
proof of the above factors as well as evidence concerning popula-
tion disparities and the vote dilution, including the use of election
returns.80 In applying the above criteria, Justice Powell determined
that an unconstitutional gerrymandering had taken place in
Indiana.
B. Impact of the Decision
The short term impact of Davis v. Bandemer is most likely to be
felt in California. Almost immediately after the decision was an-
nounced, Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Chairman of the Republican Na-
tional Committee, indicated that the Republican Party would re-
open their legal challenge of Democratically drawn congressional
districts in California."' The California case of Badham v. Eu82
may present the Court with an opportunity to expound upon its
ruling in Davis v. Bandemer. Badham grew out of the California
congressional reapportionment plan drawn in 1982, following the
1980 census. The plan, drawn by the late Representative Phillip
Burton and a Democratic political consultant, took a congressional
delegation which was split 22-21 after the 1980 elections and by
adroit line drawing turned it into a 28-17 Democratic majority.83
The plan resulted in six Republican incumbents being placed in
the same district as a fellow Republican, which virtually destroyed
the representative's old district, causing him not to run again.84
The Democratic majority in congressional seats existed even
though their percentage of the total vote was 49% in 1984 and
52% in 1986.85 Not only did the Democrats dominate the number
of seats from California, the districts they drew were noncompeti-
tive. For example, in the 1986 elections, every incumbent received
at least 57 % of the vote.86 The California case probably will pre-
sent the Court with its next encounter with political
gerrymandering.
80. Id. at 2832.
81. GOP Plans to Cite Ruling in California, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1986, at A17, col. 2.
82. 568 F. Supp. 156 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
83. 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1641 (July 19, 1986). California gained two congressional
seats from the 1980 census. 40 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2787 (Nov. 6, 1982).
84. Grofman, Criteria For Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REv.
77, 157 (1985).
85. 42 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2943 (Nov. 17, 1984). Republicans captured an additional
seat in 1984. Id.
86. 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2892 (Nov. 15, 1986).
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In Badham, the Court will have an opportunity to define the na-
ture of the right created in Davis v. Bandemer. Justice White's
equal protection factors would be difficult to apply to the facts of
Badham. First, in Badham, the history of discriminatory impact
stretches across three elections. Second, Justice White's other fac-
tors may be inapplicable because the claim is not concerned with
control of the state legislature, but with the number of congres-
sional seats.8 7
The Court may soon answer the question of whether the right
created by Davis was merely a pronouncement that the idea of
partisan political gerrymandering is wrong. An affirmative answer
to this question would support the conclusion that the Court fears
the "political thicket" and recognizes the dearth of any real stan-
dards to deal with the problem. Alternatively, the Court may en-
force the right created in Davis v. Bandemer and impose the nec-
essary guidelines and standards.
The long-range implications of the decision will probably benefit
Republicans more than Democrats. The Democrats have more to
lose because currently they control the legislatures in 28 states,
compared with 10 controlled by Republicans."8 Thus the Demo-
crats have more opportunities to gerrymander. Moreover, on the
federal level, an even more startling fact is that the states con-
trolled by Democrats contain 276 congressional seats, while the Re-
publican controlled states have only 36 seats.89 Some political ob-
servers, believe that a major reason for the Democratic Party's
dominance in the House of Representatives since 1954 has been
due to skillful gerrymandering." Quite possibly the greatest impact
of the decision will be to exert a "chilling effect" on state legisla-
tors, deterring the more egregious examples of gerrymandering af-
ter the 1990 census." Badham v. Eu could provide some indication
87. It will be interesting to see if the Court bases its decision on the fourteenth amend-
ment or on article I. In the apportionment cases, state legislatures were scrutinized under
the equal protection clause, while congressional apportionment was analyzed under article I,
section 2. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
88. 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2893 (Nov. 15, 1986).
89. Id.
90. Squeezing the Gerrymander, Wall St. J., July 3, 1986, at 16, col. 1. An interesting
question is whether the Democratic majority is due to gerrymandering, to the increased
advantages of incumbency, or due to a combination of the two. In 1986, for example, a
record 98% of House incumbents were reelected. 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2891 (Nov. 15,
1986).
91. The Court Meets The Gerrymander, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1986, at A16, col. 1; 44
Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 1642 (July 19, 1986) (quoting Michael Hess, an attorney for the Re-
publican National Committee).
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as to what standards the Court will adopt. In the interim, because
of the high threshold required by the plurality opinion, it is un-
clear which states' districting plans are constitutionally suspect.
III. WHY THE COURT SHOULD HEAR GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS
To begin any discussion of the justiciability of political gerry-
mandering it is useful to understand the nature of the wrongs asso-
ciated with political gerrymandering. Some commentators have as-
serted that political gerrymandering undermines the basic
assumptions of democracy."2 Gerrymandering, it is contended, ad-
versely affects the fair opportunity to elect representatives and in-
terferes with the right of association guaranteed by the first
amendment.9 Gerrymandering is also "alleged to result in less re-
sponsive legislative bodies because the creation of safe districts in-
sulates some members from the currents of political change and at
the same time underrepresents minority parties and minority
citizens." 9
A. The Justiciability Issue
To adjudicate claims of political gerrymandering, it is argued, is
to continue the Reynolds v. Sims command of "fair and effective
representation." This command is not completely met by equality
in population since in some districts the voting strength of a class
of citizens can be so diluted as to limit or frustrate that group's
opportunity for effective political participation. The seriousness
of the gerrymandering problem, it is posited, justifies the Court's
intervention. There are several problems with that analysis. First,
it fails to account for the American system of winner-take-all dis-
trict elections.96 The minority party, whichever it may be, always
will be frustrated or disenfranchised because it does not share the
political power despite the percentage of its votes. The only true
way to protect the minorities interest, is by a form of proportional
92. BAKER, supra note 5, at 147. The assumptions are: "representative character of legis-
lative body; effective voter choice between candidates, and the degree in which the system
reflects changes in popular sentiment." Id.
93. R. DIXON, supra note 7, at 499.
94. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103 (1980); see also Engstrom, supra note 4, at 175.
95. Grofman, supra note 84, at 112-13 (quoting Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 565
(1964)).
96. Cain, Simple vs. Complex Criteria For Partisan Gerrymandering: A Comment on
Niemi and Grofman, 33 UCLA L. REv. 213, 220-21 (1985).
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representation, a step the court explicitly refuses to take.9 7 Second,
while gerrymandering may foster the creation of safe districts in
which incumbents win election after election, it fails to consider
the importance of incumbency as a prerequisite for developing se-
niority which may provide rewards for the particular district.98
Third, justiciability of political gerrymandering, it is argued, is
compelled by the principles enunciated in Reynolds v. Sims. In
that case, the court dealt with more than the unconstitutionality of
numerical inequality; it also dealt with discrimination against a
class of voters. In the malapportionment cases, discrimination was
based on numbers, whereas in the case of discrimination through
gerrymandering the dominant political group's votes outweighed
those of the minority.9 9 Furthermore, Baker v. Carr and Reynolds
v. Sims, by forcing numerical equality of districts, marked the
courts' entry into the "political thicket" and changed the ground
rules of the game which may, in fact, have led to increased gerry-
mandering. 100 However, Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims and
its progeny differ in that the "one man, one vote" principle is
grounded upon an individual's right for his vote to count as much
as his fellow citizen's. In contrast, a gerrymandering claim is based
on a group right,101 without which the holding of Gaffney v. Cum-
mings,10 2 preventing the creation of safe legislative seats, would
necessarily be unconstitutional as violative of individual rights. 0 3
The "representation by a group" concept has the effect of reducing
an individual voter to the status of a chip or a pawn because some
Republican voters are sacrificed in Democratic districts or vice
versa. " Accordingly, the holding of justiciability in Baker and
97. See Davis, 106 S. Ct. at 2809. For an argument that the Constitution compels a
system of proportional representation, see Comment, The Constitutional Imperative of Pro-
portional Representation, 94 YALE L.J. 167 (1984).
98. MAYHEW, supra note 9 at 265.
99. Edwards, The Gerrymander And "One Man, One Vote," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 879, 890
(1971).
100. PRESS, Gerrymandering: Privileged Sanctuary or Next Judicial Target?, in REAP-
PORTIONMENT IN THE 1970's 121, 143 (N. Polsby ed. 1971); see also R. DIXON, supra note 7, at
499.
101. For example, the claim in Davis was "that each political group in a State should
have the same chance to elect representatives of its choice as any other political group." 106
S. Ct. at 2806.
102. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
103. Lowenstein & Steinberg, The Quest For Legislative Districting In The Public In-
terest: Ellusive or Illusory?, 33 UCLA L. Rav. 1, 17 (1985).
104. WELLS, REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 77, 83 (1982).
19871
368 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 15:351
Reynolds does not compel a similar holding in the context of polit-
ical gerrymandering because it addresses a different type of right.
Proponents of the justiciability of political gerrymandering also
point to cases involving racial gerrymandering claims. They main-
tain that there is no reason to hold one justiciable and the other
not, as both types have the purpose of unfairly diminishing politi-
cal representation in legislative assemblies. 0 5 While this conten-
tion is appealing, it fails to take into account the analysis of the
racial gerrymandering cases. Blacks and other groups are afforded
special protection by the Court because they are discrete and insu-
lar minorities whose access to the political system has been im-
peded by years of official and unofficial discrimination-something
the Democratic and Republican parties can hardly claim.10
Advocates of the justiciability of political gerrymandering also
point out that gerrymandering claims can be governed by judicially
cognizable standards. Various approaches have been articulated by
commentators. 10 7 An exhaustive list is provided by Bernard
Grofman in which he sets forth twelve prima facie indicators of
gerrymandering.108 However, it is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment to fully analyze all the proposed standards which the Court
could use to determine whether an unconstitutional gerrymander-
ing existed. Several commonly mentioned factors include: compact-
ness, respect for political subdivisions, intent or purpose, dramati-
cally irregular shapes, and the procedures of the legislature in
enacting the plan.109 The problem with the above standards is that
they only go to prove discriminatory intent of the legislature in-
tended to gerrymander-something which the Court has already
accepted as a given." 0 The standards by and large do not deter-
mine the discriminatory impact on the political group-a determi-
nation which should be essential to the Court's analysis.
105. R. DIXON, supra note 7, at 475.
106. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 6 n.15. See also White v. Regester, 412
U.S. 755, 768-70 (1973).
107. A synopsis of various proposals is contained in Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note
103, at 11.
108. Grofman, supra note 84, at 117-18.
109. See, e.g., Niemi, The Relationship Between Votes and Seats: The Ultimate Ques-
tion In Political Gerrymandering, 33 UCLA L. REV. 185, 193 (1985); Weinstein, Partisan
Gerrymandering: The Next Hurdle in the Political Thicket?, 1 J.L. & PoL. 357, 376 (1984);
Blackstrom, Robins & Eller, Issues in Gerrymandering: An Exploratory Measure of Parti-
san Gerrymandering Applied to Minnesota, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1121, 1138 (1978) [hereinafter
Issues In Gerrymandering].
110. See Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2808-09 (1986).
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Other criteria are based on the number of votes received in rela-
tion to seats won, the so called seat/voter ratio.111 This standard is
even more flawed than those previously mentioned. The key ques-
tion is which vote to use as a data base." 2 A pure seat/vote analy-
sis fails to take into account the normal percentage difference due
to the winner-take-all system of district elections. Furthermore,
other factors such as incumbency, personality of the candidates,
and local issues must be considered." 3 That the set of voters is to
serve as the data base presents serious problems. Because the ger-
rymander right belongs to the political parties, the data base must
be grounded on party voter strength. Some analysts have suggested
using the votes of races for obscure offices such as state auditor
and state judgeships to measure the real strength of the party." 4
The factor of party registration also fails as an indicator of dis-
criminatory impact because it does not take into account indepen-
dent voters who may frequently be aligned with a particular party
or candidate." 5 Moreover, allegiance to a political party changes
over time and is not reflected by this test. Thus the seat/voter ra-
tio is based on the erroneous premise that a "vote for a party's
candidate in one district would translate into votes for the same
party in another district.""' 6
Although under some circumstances unconstitutional gerryman-
dering may be identifiable, the question necessarily arises: What
standards can be used to fashion a remedy? In other words, how
will the court determine where the lines should be drawn?
In summary, no recognizable and easily applied test is available
for gerrymandering. Thus in all probability the Court will rely
upon a "totality of the circumstances" approach which will involve
an examination of the impact of the plan as a whole to determine
whether unconstitutional gerrymandering exists. Once the Court
perceives a gerrymandering, it will only hold the plan unconstitu-
tional if it is an example of "invidious partisan lust,""17 or if it is so
egregious as to offend the Court." 8 This standard, however, is defi-
cient because it does not provide a guide to state legislatures when
111. For an analysis of the seats/voter relationship see generally Niemi, supra note 109.
112. Id. at 204.
113. Issues in Gerrymandering, supra note 109, at 1129-30.
114. Niemi, supra note 109, at 204-5.
115. Issues in Gerrymandering, supra note 109, at 1131-32.
116. Id. at 1128.
117. Grofman, supra note 84, at 124.
118. Engstrom, supra note 4, at 212.
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they redraw their district lines every ten years. While some stan-
dards will probably be developed on a case-by-case basis, the ques-
tion remains: Is it the function of our courts to oversee every ap-
portionment plan?
The most manageable standard for the Court to impose would
be some sort of proportional representation. However, not only is
proportional representation not required by the Constitution," 9 it
would also be dangerous to the American political system. The
problems inherent in a system of proportional representation are
numerous. First, it would weaken the two-party system by encour-
aging the creation of viable third parties, thereby contributing to
political instability. Secondly, due to the failure of any party to
constitute a majority, smaller parties with little support would
hold the balance of power in forming coalitions. Since this would
require straight party-line voting, it would take away choices from
the electorate. 12 0 Such far-reaching changes in the structural
makeup of the American political system should not be decided by
the Court on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis.2 Proportional repre-
sentation, if adopted, should be the subject of serious debate and
study by society as a whole, and should ultimately be enacted by
state legislatures or by amendment to the Constitution. Interven-
tion by the Court ignores the protections inherent in the political
process against truly egregious examples of gerrymandering. For
example, a party must control both houses of the state legislature
as well as hold the governor's office in order to be successful.1 22
Another institutional limitation is that the party drawing the lines
may become too ambitious and spread its strength too thin in an
attempt to increase the size of its majority. This can only be done
by making some or all of its seats less safe.1 23 Furthermore, incum-
bent legislators represent another limitation because of their fear
of losing their core of partisan voters to help the party in another
district.124
119. Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2809 (1986); see also Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 551, 75-76 (1980).
120. Levinson, Gerrymandering And The Brooding Omnipresence Of Proportional Rep-
resentation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REv. 257, 272-73 (1985); Weinstein,
supra note 109, at 372.
121. Weinstein, supra note 109, at 372.
122. See MAYHEW, supra note 9, at 275.
123. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 67; see also Scarrow, The Impact, in
REPRESENTATION AND REDISTRICTING ISSUES 223, 231 (1982).
124. Lowenstein & Steinberg, supra note 103, at 68.
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Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court should avoid the
"thicket" of political gerrymandering. Due to the lack of clearly
manageable standards, the intensely political nature of the issue,
the protections inherent in the current system, and the dangers
presented by proportional representation, the Court should adhere
to its political question doctrine and refuse to recognize these
types of cases. The major political parties should not be able to
refight the election campaigns in the courthouse just because the
outcome did not suit them. To hold that political parties are de-
nied equal protection when they are afforded the same opportuni-
ties to compete for voters trivializes equal protection. If the Court
in such cases as Davis v. Bandemer is inclined to fully enter the
political "thicket," it should at least have a clear idea of what con-
stitutes gerrymandering and what remedies it intends to offer.
B. Political Gerrymandering and Equal Protection
Equal protection jurisprudence is traditionally divided into vary-
ing levels of scrutiny of legislative enactments. 2 " Generally, legisla-
tion concerned with social or economic matters is presumed to be
valid, and the enactment will be sustained if it is rationally related
to a legitimate state interest.'2 6 A different rule applies, however, if
a statute classifies by race, alienage, national origin, or if it affects
fundamental rights. Such legislation is subjected to strict scrutiny
and will be sustained only if the legislation serves a compelling
state interest.12 7 A third intermediate category consists of classifi-
cations based on gender and illegitimacy. 2 These classifications
will pass constitutional muster only if substantially related to a
sufficiently important government interest. 29
Claims of political gerrymandering may fit into the above rubric
in two ways. First, political gerrymandering may discriminate
against the Republican and Democratic Parties as a group. How-
ever, discrimination against a group does not automatically compel
125. Although its terms speak only to state legislation, the Court has made the equal
protection clause applicable to the federal government through the fifth amendment's due
process clause. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975).
126. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980); New Orle-
ans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
127. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 471 U.S. 1002 (1985); Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 at
303 (1976); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969); McLaughlin v. Fla.,
379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
128. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3255; Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718
(1982); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
129. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976).
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the exacting standard of review inherent in the strict scrutiny test.
Certain groups have been afforded such protections because of a
history of purposeful discrimination and because they were rele-
gated to a position of political powerlessness. This history war-
ranted extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political
process.18 0 The justification for imposing strict scrutiny on classifi-
cations affecting racial groups and aliens does not exist when the
complaining group is a major political party. The Democratic and
Republican Parties have dominated American politics since the
1850s. They simply cannot be heard to complain that they have
been effectively shut out of the political process. The rationale for
strict scrutiny is not applicable because political parties can pro-
tect themselves in the political process and do not need the courts
to win elections for them. Furthermore, major political parties lack
the other characteristics of traditionally "suspect groups." '' For
example, membership in a political party is hardly an immutable
characteristic. People can change allegiance to political parties by
changing voter registration, voting for the other party in the next
election, voting for the other party's candidate for another political
office, or simply changing the party with whom they identify. Ac-
cordingly, political parties cannot be considered suspect groups
under the traditional equal protection framework.
Although political parties do not fit into a suspect group cate-
gory, political gerrymandering may be implicated by the funda-
mental rights analysis. The Court has recognized the right to vote
as a fundamental right to which strict scrutiny applies. This right
was first recognized in Reynolds v. Sims."3 2 As noted before, how-
ever, the right recognized in Reynolds was an individual constitu-
tional right,' 8 not a group right. Justice White recognized this
when he wrote:
130. Mississippi Univ. for Women, 458 U.S. at 730.
131. Regents of Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Massachusetts Bd. of Re-
tirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976).
132. 377 U.S. 533, 576 (1964).
133. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colo., 377 U.S. 713 (1964). The Court
noted:
An individual's constitutionally protected right to cast an equally weighted vote
cannot be denied even by a vote of a majority of a State's electorate, if the appor-
tionment scheme adopted by the voters fails to measure up to the requirements of
the Equal Protection Clause .... A citizen's constitutional rights can hardly be
infringed simply because a majority of the people choose that it be.
Id. at 736-37.
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The issue here is of course different from that adjudicated in
Reynolds. It does not concern districts of unequal size. Not only
does everyone have the right to vote and to have his vote counted,
but each elector may vote for and be represented by the same
number of law makers. Rather, the claim is that each political
group in a state should have the same chance to elect representa-
tives of its choice as any other political group."u
The right established by Reynolds was the right of each individ-
ual voter to have his vote weighted equally with those of all other
citizens.3 5 The one man, one vote principle is not implicated,
much less violated, by political gerrymandering.
Since the fundamental right to vote is an individual right, politi-
cal gerrymandering claims are not included within the strict scru-
tiny standard. To hold that political gerrymandering involves an
individual right invoking strict scrutiny would necessarily require a
system of proportional representation. This result follows because
every voter in every district would have a claim that his interests
are not being represented because his party's candidate did not
win. The result would also make every attempt at a bipartisan so-
lution, such as was achieved in Gaffney v. Cummings, unconstitu-
tional because some voters would be placed in districts without any
chance of electing a representative of their own choice.
Claims of political gerrymandering also do not fit within the ru-
bric of the quasi-suspect classifications which deal with gender and
illegitimacy-based classifications.' Again, the justifications for im-
posing the higher level of scrutiny are not present when the claim
is brought by one of the major political parties.
Accordingly, one is left with the conclusion that political gerry-
mandering should be subject to the rational relationship test. As
stated by Justice Stewart in Mobile v. Bolden,1 - 7 "where a state
law does not impair a right or liberty protected by the Constitu-
tion, there is no occasion to depart from 'the settled mode of con-
stitutional analysis of legislat[ion] . . . involving questions of eco-
nomic and social policy.'" The rational relationship test is
extremely deferential to legislative judgment, and thus gerryman-
dering should pass constitutional muster provided the legislature
has an arguable basis for drawing the lines as it did. In the context
134. Davis v. Bandemer, 106 S. Ct. 2797, 2806 (1986).
135. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 576.
136. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
137. 446 U.S. 55, 76 (1980) (quoting San Antonio Indep. School Dist., 411 U.S. at 33).
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of political gerrymandering, the legislature should be able to show
that its lines are drawn rationally, even if the lines can be drawn
better, because the Court will defer to the legislature. 3 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court completed its entry into the
"political thicket" in Davis v. Bandemer. The Court's decision,
however, provides more questions than answers. The absence of
any clear standards for identifying unconstitutional gerrymander-
ing keeps the lower courts and state legislatures in the dark. The
Court's decision in Davis v. Bandemer leaves the impression that
the Court believes that partisan political gerrymandering is gener-
ally bad and may in some cases be unconstitutional.
The Court should stay out of the political gerrymandering ques-
tion whenever possible, and when impossible, judge the apportion-
ment plan under a rational relationship test. While political gerry-
mandering may offend the justices' sensibilities and sense of fair
play, it is another thing altogether for the Court to use its power of
judicial review to strike down state enactments without constitu-
tional justification.
138. For cases illustrating the wide latitude accorded to legislatures under the rational
relationship test, see, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Railway Ex-
press Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976)
(per curiam).
